Decision making in democracies is always messy.  Proponents of different viewpoints propose various problem definitions, solutions, and implementation strategies, and it takes time to work through these differences.  However, there is a more specific reason for the delay.  There is a long term internal struggle about war-fighting strategy going on inside the United States Army. This struggle between proponents of conventional warfare versus unconventional warfare has unfortu nately delayed successful strategy implementations in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Most American Army officers attaining high rank are from conventional combat branches: infantry, artillery or armor.  They are trained to fight conventional wars, where two organized armies fight each other with conventional tactics taught in military academies and training centers around the world.  The members of these armies are clearly distinguished from civilians.  They live in their own bases that are strictly segregated from indigenous populations.  No attempts are made to understand local civilian cultures, or to influence civilian attitudes, or to enlist civilian aid against the enemy.  They do not understand insurgencies or guerilla warfare, they are not trained in counterinsurgency tactics, and they have contempt for those who are so trained.

In spite of the dominance of conventional warfare proponents over war-fighting strategy, the American military has specialized units that engage in various forms of unconventional warfare operating under the Special Operations Command.  The units that are most identified with counterinsurgency tactics are the Special Forces.  Special Forces members are trained in local languages and cultures, and they operate in small teams, interacting closely with native civilians instill pro-American attitudes and behaviors. They train native militias to engage in counter-insurgency guerrilla warfare tactics against the enemy.  They live with the civilians, generally sharing their lives and hardships.

The successful overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the winter of 2001-2002 was a Special Operations masterpiece.  Special Forces and other special operations personnel infiltrated Afghanistan and made contact with local anti-Taliban tribal chieftains.  They lived with the tribes and coordinated the ground war activities of the various tribal militias with airstrikes from American land and carrier based aircraft.  This combination quickly destroyed the Taliban as an organized army and government.

Unfortunately after 2002 the Afghan War was taken over by conventional Army units who established fortified bases from which they patrolled and raided, and then returned to their bases.  This was our primary tactic in Vietnam, and it is not a successful counterinsurgency strategy.  The reemergence of the Taliban can arguably be attributed to our shift from unconventional to conventional warfare.

The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was spearheaded by conventional Army armor and infantry units, which made sense since the opponent was the conventionally organized Iraqi Army. However, the Iraqi Army was quickly overcome as a fighting force, and since the summer of 2003 the Iraq War has been an insurgency that cannot be won with conventional units using conventional tactics.

The Bush Administration has been loath to identify the Iraq War as an insurgency.  Finally, thanks greatly to the influence of Army Generals Peter Shoomaker and David Petraeus, both of whom are unconventional warfare proponents, the administration has admitted that the Iraq War is an insurgency and has begun applying some of the successful counterinsurgency tactics learned in Afghanistan in 2001-02. Essentially convention units are receiving on the job training in counterinsurgency tactics.  The segregated base concept is being abandoned in favor of small units of American troops living in neighborhoods, towns and villages throughout Iraq.  We are allying with local tribal chieftains and thereby enticing tribal militias to fight on our side.

This strategy shift has thus far been remarkably successful in Iraq, and we can only hope that the next administration resists the Army’s natural tendency to return to a conventional warfare paradigm that is clearly not applicable to early 21st Century wars.